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New results on using exclusion restrictions to identify and eatimate average treatment effects
are presented. Identification is achieved given a minimum of patametric assumptions, ini-
tially without reference to a latent index framework. Most econometric analyses of evaluation
models motivate identifying assumptions using models of individual behavior. Out technical
conditions do not fit easily into a conventional discrete choice framework, rather they fit into
a framework where the source of identifying information is institutional knowledge regarding
program administration. This framework also suggeats an attractive experimental design for
research using human subjects, in which eligible participants need not be denied treatment.
We presenL a simple instrumental variables estimator for the average effect of treatment on
program participants, and show that the estimator attains Chamberlain's semi-parametric
efficiency bouncl. Tlie bias of estimatora that satisfy only exclusion reatrictiona is also consid-
ered. Strouger assumptions restrictiug participation behavior are introduced. Under these
assumptions, satisfied by latent index models, semi-parametric indentification of average
treatment effect remains possible.1
1. INTRODUCT[oN. Do programs that subaidize education and training improve the labor
market outcomes of program participanta? Evaluation questiona of thia type are of great
coucern to government policy makera, private employers, and academic researchers. In any
field where scientific research has policy implications, evaluation methodology is also of con-
siderable importance. Discussions of evaluation methodology are discusaions of the nature
and credibility of scientific evidence. In medical research, for example, government regula-
tions establish standards and procedures that researchers must follow for their results to be
considered credible evidence for the efficacy and safety of new drugs. Standards here are
quite clear: research guidelines for a new drug application clearly favor, but do not require,
the randomized assigment of treatment and concurrent data collection on control groups
(Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 1988, pp. 22, 56)
Social policy is arguably as important for human welfare as public health, yet no mutually
agreed standard of evidence exists for establishing the effectiveness of social programs. On
the one hand, critical research on econometric evaluation methodology by Lalonde (1986)
and others has led to renewed interest in classical experimentation as a tool for social policy
evaluations. Manski and Garfinkel (1991) note that the recent Job Partnership Training Act
(JPTA) even mandates a particular sort of treatment-control evaluation design in which
applicants for training are randomly denied treatment. On the other hand, Manski and
Garfinkel (1991) and Heckman and Hotz ( 1989) argue persuasively that experiments can
never be a complete substitute for evaluations using observational data. Disagreements overz
evaluation methodology notwithstanding, research directed towards adapting experimental
designs for social policy analysis and allowing for fewer assumptions in observational anal-
yses is likely to remain important. This paper contributes to both the experimental and
observational components of the evaluation research agenda by presenting new results on
using exclusion restrictions to identify and estimate avcrage treatment effects.
Our findings are related to results in a number of recent papers on theoretical identi-
fication in evaluation models. Like Chamberlain (1986), Heckman (1990a) and Heckman
and Honoré (1990), we are concerned with identification given a minimum number of para-
metric assumptions. But, like Manski (1990), we avoid the additive latent index framework
commonly invoked in econometric evaluations. Much of the previous work on identifica-
tion presents some very general findings regarding the identification of distributions, but
devotes relatively little attention to converting theoretical identification into empirically fea-
sible estimators. In contrast, the formulation in this paper focuses on conditional means,
and is immediately useful to applied researchers because it provides necessary and sufficient
conditions for linear instrumental variables techniques to consistently estimate the average
effect of treatment. In this, our approach is related to Angrist's (1991) use of instrumental
variables to estimate treatment effects in nonlinear models, although here the idenLification
conditions are not motivated by functional form restrictions.
We also show how to interpret the identifying assumptions as outlining a particular type of
experimental design useful for research involving human subjects. Like IIeckman (19906), we3
view social experiments as a source of identifying information, rather than as a replacement
for economic modelling, and think that experiments should be designed with this in mind.
An experimental design interpretation is important because the resulting design may be
ethically more attractive than the conventional approach to randomization wherein eligible
program applicants are randomly excluded from treatment. For example, some physicians
have argued that randomization is incompatible witó the Personal Care Principle in medical
ethics, which requires doctors to put the welfare of their patienta above the potential social
gains ftom research (Royall 1991). JPTA program adminiatrators are also reluctant to deny
training to applicants randomized into a control group (Hotz 1991).
Our framework for experimental design essentially consists of first choosing an eligible
population or evaluation site, either by randomized manipulation,or on the basis of ignorable
(as defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin [1983]) covariates. Any eligible participant is then
allowed to participate in the program if he or she likes. This approach may also identify
parameters which are more likely to be useful for forecasting the impact of future programs3
As a related by-product, our approach to inference also provides some insight regarding
the problem of non-compliance in clinical trials, recently analyzed by Efron and Feldman
(1991) and Robins (1989). Randomization of intention-to-treat, but not actual treatment,
is one way to generate exclusion reatrictions that will be sufficient to identify an average
3Harria (1985) and Moffit (19916) also discues randomization of aites versus randomization of individu-
als. However, a key diatinction is that within eites these suthors azgue for eaturation of treatment within
sites while we do not. Different average treatment effetts are therefore identified in the two types of site-
randomization designs.4
treatment effect. Not surprisingly, the estimator that uses these exclusion restrictions is a
form of instrumental variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally defines the average effect of treat-
ment on program participants and presents the main theoretical results. Necessary and
sufficient conditions are given for a data generating process to identify an average treatment
effect under exclusion restrictions. These results are also compared to previous results on
the identification of treatment effects. Section 3 outlines the instrumental variables inter-
pretation of identifying information and discusses the type ot expcrimental design or data
generating processes that satisfy the identifying conditions. Some results on the eSicient
use of exclusion restrictions in estimating average treatment effects are also discussed. In
section 4 we discuss what can be learned about treatment effecta if the average treatment
effect of interest is not identified. It is shown that under mild additional restrictions one
might still be able to derive bounds for the average treatment effect or identify local average
treatment effects. Section 5 offers a summary and some concluding thoughts on the nature
of identifying information in models for the evaluation of social programs. An important
distinction, and an underlying theme of the paper is the difference between identifying infor-
mation derived from models of program participants' behavior and from information about
program eligibility rules. We argue that the latter is more likely to provide a convincing
empirical identification strategy.
2.1 IDENTIFICATION. Our framework is essentially similar to that advanced by Rubin (1977),r~
Heckman (1990), and others. Let Yo be the response variable for an individual if he or she
does not participate in the program. We assume that Yo is well defined even if the individual
is actually participating in the program. Similarly, Yl is the value of the response variable
if the individual does participate in the program, and Y~ - Yo is the treatment effect that
we are interested in. We never observe both Yo and Yl; all inferences about these differences
are indirect and in terms ofexpectations. Let fo(y) and it(y) denote the probability density
functions of Yo and Yl respectively. P denotes an indicator for program participation, equal
to one if an individual participates in the program, and equal to zero otherwise.
The average treatment effect can be defined in a number of ways (See, e.g., Heckman
and Robb [1985], and Heckman [1990]). First, there is the expectation of Yl - Yo in the
population:
(1) á- E[Y~ - Yo] - f Y[ft(y) - Ïo(y)]dy
This is the expected treatment effect if we take an individual randomly from the population
and look at the difference between his response as a participant and nonparticipant. A second
average treatment effect is defined by taking the expectation conditional on participation:
(2) ~ - E[Y~ - Yo~P -11- fyff~(y~P -1) - Jo(yIP -1)ldy
This measures how much a participant gains from the program. Whether the focus is on the
average treatment effect (ATE), á, or on the selected average treatment effect (SATE), a,
depends on the particular application. We are usually interested in forecasting the effects6
of a program when it is extended to a larger part of society. If the program or treatment
will potentially be used by all members of the population, á is appropriate. If the program
will eventually be used by a population with characteristics similar to the population in the
evaluation design, a is the relevant average treatment effect. The latter is probably more
realistic in economic applications. We will therefore concentrate on identification of a, rather
than á.
The problem of estimating average treatrnent efíects in our [ramework is one of sarnplc
selection exactly the same as that considered by Gronau ( 1974), Heckman ( 1979) and Manski
(1990). We observe Y- P. Yi f (1 - P) ~ Yo aud P. From this two conditional responsc
distributions are identified:
h(yIP- I) and jo(yIP- ~),
along with the probability of participation, q - Pr(P - 1). These distributions do not
allow us to calculate á or a, for which we need to know the counterfactual expectation
j y- jo(yI P- 1)dy. The difference between the mean of Yl for those who participate and Yo
for those who do not participate can be written as
EIYiIP- 11 -EIYoIP -~1
-~IY~-yóIP-11~-~~(YoI~'-11-I,[YuI~'-o)-at~i
The average difference in outcomes between program participanta and nonparticipants gen-
erally confounds the treatment effect a and the selection efEect Q. The exception is when7
f,(y~P - 1) is equal to f;(y~P - 0) for i- 0,1 and all y, in which case selection is sometimes
said to be ignorable. This implies that the two reaponse distributions (with and without
participation) do not depend on the deciaion to participate. If this is not the case then
selection is non-ignorable and it is clear that we need more information, or restrictions on
fo(.), to separate n and ~f. Below, we briefly review some identifying assumptions.
The first approacli assumes that the aelection problem can be solved aimply by condi-
tioning on the right covariates.
Condition 1 7'hcy~c is an obscrvablc covariatc X such lhal
EIYIP-I,X -zJ-EIYIP-D,X -z~
In this case we can condition on X to remove the selection effect if we observe (Y, P,X):
n- f EIYi~P-1,X-xI-EIYo~P-1,X-x)'9(x~P-1)dx
- f EIYi~P-1,X-z~-EIYoIP-O,X-x~'9(x~P-1)dx
This is in terms of expectations and distributions that can usually be estimated. The selec-
tion effect is equal to:
,~- f EIYo~P-1,X -x~'9(xIP- 1)-EIYo~P-fl,X -x~'9ÍsIP-fl)~dx
- f FIYI P- ~, X- x~ '~9(x~P - 1) - 9(xI P- ~)~dx8
WInCII Can ale0 bC C9t11IlatC(I. If (f(x~Y - I) - 9(x~!' - 0) for xll x, in,~,lying that I'r(N - I ~r)
does not depend on x, selection is ignorable after all and the selection effect is zero.
Conditioning on covariates corresponds to identification by adequately controlling for all
factors related to both outcomes and treatment. References for this approach include Rubin
(1977) and, in a regression framework, Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger (1981). A generalized
control function methodology is outlined by Heckman and Robb (1985). An alternative
approach to evaluation restricts the manner in which treatment is assigned. For example,
treatment may be randomly assigned. In an experimental context, the distinction between
approaches to causalinference based on control and randomization dates back at least to
Fisher ( 1935). The econometric approach to restricting the manner of treatment assignment
is to impose an exclusion restriction:
Condition 2 There is a random variaóle "L such that for all z
EIYoIZ - z] - EIYo]
and
E(P~Z - z] is a non trivial function of z
The covariate Z affects the participation probability, but is not related to the expected
response in the absence oí treatment.
Exclusion restrictions are widely used in econometrics, usually in conjunction with otlier
identifying restriction. One of the most influential approaches is that developed iu a seric;s9
of papers by Heckman (1976, 1979). The following example is a aimplification of the model




The conditional expectation of Yo given Z- z ia
EIYo~Z-z]-pfE]E~Z-z]-p
and since participation depends on both Z and U, it satisfiea Condition 2. Notice that the
treatment effect a in (3) is identical for every aubject, so it is equal to the average and
selected average treatment effects.
Another example is Angrist's (1991) nonlinear model with an omitted vaciable, U, that
is correlated with P, but independent of an excluded instrument Z:
EIYIP-RU-u,Z-z]-F(P,u;Q)
E(P~U - u,Z - z) - G(u,z;7)
and Z and U independent. Angrist shows that the average treatment effect
~- EIF(1, U; Q) - F(0, U; Q)]10
is identified if and only if F or C is additively separable. In most of the econometric
literature identification is based on diatributional assumptions, functional form assumptions
regarding either the conditional expectation of the response function and the probability
of participation or both. ln our main result, we investigate when the exclusion restriction
outlined in condition 2 is sufficient to identify the average treatment effect. Our approach is
to invokc easily vcrifiablc re~strictious on thc valuc o( h(z, u) aud thc divtributiuu of 'I,.
Condition 3 There is a set 2o such lhat 1 ~ Pr(Z E Zo) 1 0, Pr(P - 1[Z - z) - 0 jor
allzEZo.
Theorem 1 Conditions 2 and 3 aresufficient Jor identificatfon oJa with a random sa~npte
of (Y, Z, P).
Proof: Let A be an indicator for the event Z~ Zo. Then:
E[Y~A - 0] - E[Yo]
E[YI A- 11 - E[YoIA - 1J -~ Pr[P - l IA - 11 ~ E[Yi - YoI A- 1, P- 11
-E[Yo1tPr[P-1IA-11~E[Yi-YoIP-11
Since we can consistently estimate Pr[P - 1~A - 1], E[Y~A - 0] and E[Y~A - 1] we can
identify cr - E[Yc - Yo~P - 1].
QED.ii
The theorem above showa that it is sufficient for identification to have a value, or set
of values, 20, which is realized with non-zero probability and for which the probability of
participation is zero. The question arises whether this is a necessary as well as a sufficient
conditiou. A complete answer is difficult to give. But, a number of related results auggest
that it is almost impossible to achieve identification otherwise. First we note that the key
to identifying a is the identification of E[Yo]:
Result 1 a is identified if and only ij E[Yo] is identified.
Proof: By definition a- E(Y1~P - 1] - E(Yo~P - 1]. Note that E[Y1~P - 1] is identified
because we observe Y~ if P- 1. Therefore identification of a is equivalent to identification of
E(Yo~P - 1]. This is equal to {E[YoJ -(1 - Pr(P - 1)) . E[Yo~P - 0]}~Pr(P - 1). Because
E[Yo~P - 0] and Pr(P - 1) are identified, identification of E[Yo~P - 1] is equivalent to
identification of E(Yo].
QI;D.
Second, we show that if Z is a discrete random variable, Condition 3 ia indeed necessary
for indentification of E[Yo] and therefore for identification of a:
Result 2 Suppose Z is a discrete random variable with K points of support. Ij Pr(P -
1~Z - zk) ~ 0 for all k, then E(Yo] is not identified without additional restrictions.
Proof: We can identify from the sampling design, for k - 1, ..., K,
E(Y~Z- zkJ -E(Yo]tPr(P- 1~Z -zk).E[Y~ -Yo~Z-zk]12
There are K equations in K t 1 unknowns. Therefore we cannot identify E[Yo] without some
restriction on E[Y~ - Yo~7. - zk] if Pr(P - 1 ~7. - zk] ~ 0 for all k. Note that one restriction
such as the equality of the conditional difference E[Yl - Yo~Z - z~] for kl and ko is sufficient
for identification of E[Yo].
Q~D.
The reason that R.esults 1 and 2 do not consitute a complete argument for suf6ciency
is that if Z is not discrete, it might be possible to identify E[Yo] in certain limiting cases,
even when Condition 3 faila. In fact, this sort of ridentification at infinity" is an underlying
theme of a number of previous results on the identification of treatment effects.
2.2 COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS IDENT[FICATION RESULTS. Conditions 2 and 3 and
Theorem 1 are related to some recent results on semi-parametric identification. In latent
index models like (3)-(5), if the disturbances are normal then there is clearly no set Eo
auch that the participation probability ie zero for that set. This implies that we camiot
estimate E[Yo] - E[Y~A - 0], Lhe expected response for those who had zero probability
of participating, so that identification cannot be based on Theorem 1. However, one might
be able to estimate E[Yo] in te limit. One such approach is Condition B in Heckman's
(1990) theorem on nonpatametric identification of treatment effects in a latent-index sample
selection model. Heckman requires the support oi y- Z in the latent index to be the real line.
Therefore, there is a sequence of sets 2„ such that the probability of participating goes to
zero in the limit. That is, there is a sequence of sets Z,,, such that for all sequences of real13
numbera p„ ~ 0 and ó„ ~ 0 convergingto zero, Pr(Z E Zn) 1 ó,,, and Pr(P - 1 ~Z - z) G q„
for all z E 2,,. If the limit lim„-,~ E[Yo~P - 0, Z E 2„] - E[Ya] for all auch sequences q„
and ó~, then an estimate based on such a sequence can take the place of E[Yo~A - O] in
the proof of Theorem 1 and identification is still obtained. This is aimilar to an earlier
result in Chamberlain (1986) regarding semi-parametric identification of censored regression
models. But Chamberlain (p. 205) and Heckman (p. 317) aeem to feel that this sort of
"identification at infinityT ia not a very compelling foundation for inference. Chamberlain
explores the possibility of imposing additional mild reatrictiona that would actually rule out
this result.
[dentification at infinity is unnatural in latent index modela partly because many, if not
most, regressora in economics have bounded aupport and are discrete. Moat importantly,
however, the latent index framework ia usually motivated from a model of individual choice.
Although the economic theory of discrete choice is well-developed and generally accepted,
the details of empirical implementation are not. Identification at infinity requirea not only
covariates shifting choices but excluded from outcomea, but also covariate-choice relationship
tliat obey certaiu very special restrictiona witiiout intrinaic behavioral content.
Both our Theorem 1 and previous resulta rely on exclusion restrictions and restrictions on
the probability of participating for certain groups. Therefore, identification under Theorem
1 is similar to identification under the resulta of Chamberlain (1986) and Heckman (1990).
Ou~~ eascutial f~~at.~ne, howaver, distinguishea our approac:h frotn tl~e Lraditional ecouon~etric14
viewpoint: In Theorem 1, the main source of identifying information - the set of covariates
for whom the probability oí participation ia zero - is obtaincd from the knowledge thaL Uic
program was simply not offered to certain individuala or groups. A latent index framework
in thia case ia unnnatural and unnecessary; with this sort of prior information there is no
need to rely on limiting behavior. The argument we make for identifying information from
ptogram eligibility rules is exactly that made informally in a recent paper by Mof6t ( 1991).
Finally, we note that Manski (1990) presents similar results regarding identification of
density functions in selection models without reference to a latent index framework. Manski's
Corollary 2(p. 30) ahows that given certain level-set restrictiona, nonparametric bounds on
density functions coincide, and therefore the density function is identified, if and only if the
probability of selection is one for some part of the population. Like Heckman and Cham-
berlain, however, Manski (p. 30) seems to feel that identifying with level-set restrictions is
"racely identifying in practice.r Part of the reason for this is that while the results by Man-
ski and Heckman give identification in principla, Chamberlain provc:s Lhat the informatiou
bound can be zero for these models. Our approach requires that Pr(Z E Zo) ~ 0, which
implies that the treatment effect is estimable at rate ~.
Recent empirical examples of evaluations in this framework include the geographically
randomized Educational Assiatance Teat Program (EATP) and Multiple Option Recruiting
Experiment (MORE), in which different packages of veterans educational benefits were ran-
domized over military recruitment stations (Fernandez [1982~). In the EATP and MORE, no15
new benefit packages were offered to a random subsample of stations. Obaervational exam-
plea where the source of identifying information ia derived from inatitutions include Angrist's
(1990) use of the draft lottery to eatimate the labor market consequences of Vietnam-era mil-
itary service, Angrist and Krueger's (1989) use of birthday-ordering to estimate the effecta
of World War II military service, and Angriat and Krueger's (1991) use of the interaction
between compulsory achool attendance laws and quarter of birth to eatimate the effecta of
compulsory schooling on earnings.
As in most econometric applicationa the example listed above were implemented using
statistical models with a constant treatment effect, so that the exclusion reatrictiona alone
are sufficient for indentification. But selected average treatment effects may also be identified
in some of theae cases. For example, in the compuleory schooling application, virtually all
students born in certain quartera were compelled to complete an additional year ofschooling.
Other atudenta chose whether or not to go on; the treatment in this case ia failure to complete
an additional year ofschooling. Likewise, in the Vietnam~ra draft lottery, virtually all non-
deferred men with low lottery numbers were drafted!
2.3 AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS
If instead of the set io we had a set 2~ such that Pr(P - 1~7. - z) - 1 for all z E~i,
we would be able to identify the selected average non-treatment effect:
-~-EIYo-YlIP-O~
~For the identification reaults of this paper to hold in the lottery exa.mple, deferment would have to be
an ignorable covariate.16
This measure how much non-participants gain (or lose) from not participating in the pro-
gram. This result is obvious if we reverse what we call treatment and non-treatment. I[
there is both a set ?~ that satiafies Condition 3 and a set Zl that satisfies the above condition
we can identify the average treatment effect á. The three treatment effects are related by
the following identity:
á-Pr[P-1].ctt(1-Pr[P-1])-á
Intuition for why a is identified is apparent from the proof of Theorem 1: E[Yo] is identified
in the sample where Z E Zo, and E[Yl] is identified in the set where Z E Z~. If the treatment
effect is identical for everybody then a- á! - á. In general however, the treatment effects
for participants and non-participants can be different, and in that case identification of the
average treatment effect (ATE) requires stronger assumptions than does identification of thc
selected treatment effect (SATE).
3.1 ELIGIBILITY-RANDOMIZATION AS AN EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN. Social experiments
can be based on randomly assigned eligibility wherein individuals freely choose whether or
not to participate. Let D be an indicator for the willingness to participate, equal to 1 if
someone is willing to participate aud zero otherwiae. Suppose there is some characteri,t.ic,
indicated by a binary variable A, where only people with A- 1 are eligible for treatment,
and the joint distribution of response Y and willingness to participate D dces not depend




This is clearly much atronger than needed, but it makea the identification etrategy transpar-
ent. A direct consequence is E[Yo~A - a] - E[Yo] and therefore A satisfiea both conditions
2 and 3 and we can identify the aelected average treatment effect
~-EfY~-YoIP-l1 -E[Y~-YoID-11 -E[YIA-1]-E[YIA-0]. Pr(P - 1~A - 1)
The SATE is in this case the expected treatment effect for a11 participants if eligibility
were to be extended to the entire population, i.e. if A- 1 for all individuals. Our result
differs [rom that in Heckman (1990b, p. 27) becauae we compare eligibles and ineligibles
where Heckman compares participanta and ineligibles. The combination of the ineligiblea
and eligible non-participanta allows us to identify the distribution of Yo for those who are
willing to participate:
f(YoID-1)- Pr(D-1)f(YoIA-O)- 1 P(DD 1)1)f(YoIA-1,P-0),
where Pr(D - 1) - Pr(D - 1~A - 1) is identified from the proportion of participants
among eligibles.
An exampleof a reaearch design based on this principle might use the fact that a program
is started in a particular community, and only members of that community are eligible to18
enter the program. If there is a neighbouring community with similar members, we can use
the members of that community to control for the selection effect that would arise if we just
cuuiparcd Lhc participants aud uon - participanta u[ Llic couunuuity Lhat startcd Lhc prograiu.
Ilarrix ( 198~i), Carfinki~l, Manxki 1tn(1 MIC11Ah11N)IIION ( 191)I) xn~l Mu(Gt (I!1!)I) ndw Lu
experiments of this type as macrcexperiments, in contrast to microexperiments in which
individuals within a site are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. These
suthors stress that such macroexperiments can potentially identify macro treatment effects
that result from interaction between individuals. An important difference between our ap-
proach and previous discussion of macro experiments, however, is that we are not arguing
for saturation of treatment within eligible sites.s
A further advantage of an experiment in which eligibility is randomly assigned is that
there is no formal application procesa for subjects who will later be randomized out. The
need to deny treatment is a major factor in the dissatisfaction of job training centers with
randomized assigment (Manski and Garfinkel 1991). Morecever, in medical research, eligi-
bility randomization does not require that individual physicians deuy a treatment they [cel
is beneficial (as ocurred in the controversial ECMO (extracorporeal membrane oxygenation]
atudy of infant mortality; see Royall, [1991J). Instead of randomizing treatment within hos-
pitals, randomly chosen hospitals could have been selected for study, with physicians freely
choosing the most approriate treatment within eligible sites, and data collected on outcomes
SThe Wieconain Child Support Demonatration (Garfinlcel 1983) followa thie basic approach. Treatments
in thia atudy are randomized over Wiaconain countiea, althougó the focus ie on county-level outcomea and
not the iodividual outcomea captured by SATE as defined here.19
at all sites. Another issue of interest in medical research is the question of non-compliance
in conventional clinical trials. It is clear that as long aa eligibilíty for treatment ("intention-
to-treat" in biometric jargon) is randomized, the effect of a binary treatment on participants
is idcutitiixl.
3.2 LINEAR INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATION. In this section we show that if
conditions 2 and 3 are satisfied we can estimate a in a etraightforward manner. First we
discusa the case where we observe Y, P and A, an indicator for the event Z~ Zo. In this
case we can estimate a by linear instrumental variables. Second, we analyze the case where
we observe Y, P and Z. It turns out that this does not necessarily increase the efficiency of
our estimate of the treatment effect. Finally we discuss estimation if we do not observe A
itself, but a variable correlated with A.
The first estimator is a linear instrumental variables estimatot. The variable A is an
instrument for the endogenous regresaor P in the regression function
(6) E[YIA1- L[Yo] t E[P~A] . E[Y~ -YaIP - 11
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n-r n-1
The question naturally arisea whether we can improve on this estimate of the selected
average treatment effect if we observe Z as well as A. Using Chamberlain's (1987) approach
to semi-parametric efficiency bounds one can show that this is only possible if Z affects the
conditional variance of Yo:
Theorem 2 Ij the conditional variance ojYo, E[(Yo - E[Yo])~~Z - z] does not depend on
z. then d is an e,~cient estimator for a. IJ the conditiona! variance does depend on z, one
can obtain a more e,~icient estimator by replacing YA-o in the jormula jor d 6y an e,~cient
estimator Jor E[Yo] that adapts for the heteroscedasticity.
Proof: see appendix.
This theorem shows that the only information in observing Z lies in the heteroscedasticity of
Yo. However, it is unusual to have a case where one has a convincing argument that Z docs
not belong in the conditional mean function, but dces belong in the conditional variance
function. Therefore, in most cases the instrumental variables estimator based on A will be
efficient.
Finally, note that if conditions 2 and 3 are satisfied but we do not observe A, we can still
consistently estimate a if we observe a random variable X satisfying21
Condition 4 E[Y~A,X] - E[Y~A] E[P~A,X] - E[P~Aj
Condition 4 impliea that X affects mean outcomea and treatment probabilitiea only througó
its effect on eligibility A. In this case we can use X as an instrument instead of A. To see
this, note that írom (6);
E{E[Y~Aj~X} - E[Yo) f E[Yl -YoIP - 1]' E{E[P~A]~X}
which simplifies to
E[Y~X] - E[Yo] t E[Yl - Yo~P - Ij ' E[PIXJ
This implies that X is a valid instrument. It is clcar that uaing Uoth X sud A aa irtstrwncuts
is equivalent to using just A because X doea not add any infonnation once A ia known.
However, X may be uaeíul if A ie not obeerved. In the example of the draft lottery, one
might envision knowing the week a peraon was born, but not the exact day. In that case the
week is the inaccurate instrument X while the actual day on which a person is born woutd
be the accurate instrument A.
4. INFERENCE WHEN THE SELECTED AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IS NOT IDENTIFIED.
In this section we discuss what can be learned about treatment effecta when Condition 3
is not satisfied. First we investigate what we can learn about the selected treatment effect
even if we cannot estimate it consistently. The second approach investigates whether there
are other interesting average treatment effects that we can estimate consistently even if
Condition 3 is not satisfied.22
We asswne tliat Condition 'l is satisficd, but not Condition 3. Thcrc is no coutrol group
of ineligibl~, and therefore an essential component of the instrumental variables approach
discussed in the previous section is miasing. We also asaume that Z is discrete with points
of support z~, zs, ... , zy. Let pr~ - Pr(P - 1~Z - zt), a:. - EIYi - Yo~P - 1, Z- zk],
ak - Pr(Z - zk) and Q- Pr(P - 1) -~xkpik. In terms of these parameters, the selected




The probability limit of the instrumental variables estimator for a, using Z as an instrument
for P can be derived as follows: Note that
EIYI Z- zk1- EIYoJ ~ ~~. ' P:.
Define




E~P,. (P:. - Q))
The ak are weights that have expectation equal to one, but they can be negative.






ao - E E(pz~) o,.
Proof: The first part follows directly from the expresaion for E[Y~Z - zk] and the defini-
tions for a,k and ak. To see the second part, write:
1
. [aa - aao]
1-a
- 1 rE[P:.(P:,, -Q)a,.j - E[p;,,] EÍP;.] 1
1- a l EÍP~.(P:. - 4)] EÍP,.(P:, - Q)] EÍP;.]o"1
which aimplifies to E[p,~a,,,~Q] which is equal to a. QED.
ao is a weighted average treatment effect, with weighta proportional to p;w. If the treat-
ment effect ia constant, then both ao and aa coincide with the aelected average treatment
effect a. Therefore if we are prepared to bound the treatment effect heterogeneity, we can
calculate corresponding bounda for the aelected average treatment effect. Note that a in the
above reault is estimable from the datae Define c- ao~a. If there is no treatment effect
heterogeneity, then c- 1. The bias of the IV estimator is, in terms of c and .1:
a 1
aa-a.c~(1-A)
a measures how big the bias of the IV estimator can be because of treatment heterogeneity.
eIn Angrist and Krueger (1990) a ie estimated to be about 2.5 fot the relation between quarter of birth
and higó echool graduation.24
Now we will turn to the question whether there is any other average treatment effect that
can be estimated if Condition 3 is not satisfied. We start by strengthening Condition 2:
Condition 5 Let Z 6e any observed random variable and U 6e any random variable such
that
E(Y~U-u,Z-z]-E[Y~U-u] fori-0,1
P - h(U, Z)
U and Z are independent, and E[h(U,Z)~Z - z] is a non-trivial Junclion oJz.
This condition is stronger than Condition 2 for two reasons. First, E[Yo~U - u, Z- z] -
E(Yo[U - u] combined with independence of Z and U implies that F,[Ya~Z - z] - F,(Y~] but
not the other way round. Second, this condition puts restrictions on the expected value of
Yi given Z- z, whereas Condition 2 dces not put any restrictions oti the distribution of
Yl given Z at all. The modelling in terms of unobserved characteristics allows us to restrict
the participation equation in a way that might reflect our assumptions about underlying
behavior. Let p~ - Pr(P - 1~Z - z) ~ 0 for all z.
Condition 8 For all zo, z~, such that p„ ~ p~,
(p:, - p~) . [h(z~, u) - h(zo, u)] 1 0 for all u
If p~, - p,~ then h(zl,u) - h(zo,u) for all u.25
This condition implies that there is some monotonicity in the participation decision. If
someone with U- ur will participate if Z- zl but not if Z- zo, then there is nobody
(i.e nu valuc o[ u) whu will participxte witlr Z- z~ but not with Z- zr. Lr othcr words,
the effect of a change in Z has the same aign no matter what the value of U. If Condition
6 does not hold, it is dif6cult to compare the average reaponses for participants and non-
participanta for different value of Z becauae one cannot say anything about the difference in
the distribution of u between participanta with Z- zo and participanta with Z- zr.
Suppose that participation is determined by a additive latent index model
P-1[7.ZfU~Oj
In that case (but not only in that case) condition 6 is eatisfied. This ahowa that the apecifi-
cation of the additive latent index model is indeed more restrictive than the specification in
Condition 2.
Another way of stating the same restriction on the participation decision is the following
condition. It corrrpares the distribution of U[or participants with different values of Z.
Condition 7 IJJor any two values zr and zo, p„ ~ p~ then
Ï(u~P - 1, Z- zr) - p-` Í(u~P - I, Z- zo) f P"pz~p~ Jzr, zo(u)
and if P~, L P~o
J(uI P- I, Z- zo) - p~Í(uIP- I, Z- zi) f p~p~p" fzr, zo(u)26
for sonie j~,,~(u ) 1 O Aatl9fyiuy I jz~. zo(t~)du - I.
Reault 4 Conditions ti and 7 are equivalent if Condition 1 holds.
Proof: See Appendix.
These two conditions allow us to make comparisone between the difference in average
response between those who participate and those who do not, for the two groups, those
with Z- zo and those with Z- z~. We cannot compare these differences in general,
because we have no way of comparing the associated U distributions, but condition 7 gives
us a handle on this comparison.
Result 5 If Conditions 5 and 7 hold, then we can identify the following average treatment
effect:
n:~,~ -~IYi - Yolh~zi, U) ~ h~zo, U)) - f~~IYi - Yo~U - u~Iz~, zo~u)du
Proof: See Appendix.
The interpretation of this result is that we can identify the average treatment effect for
the ~changers", or the "local~ average treatment effect. These individuals are characterized
by a value of U such that a change from Z - zo to Z- z~ induces them to start or stop
participating. a~,,,~ measures the average gain that this group makea from participating.
To see how far this result can take us towards identification of the selected average
treatment effect a, consider the case where 'I, has a discrete distribution with points of
support zo,z1i...,zK. Let p~w - Pr(P - 1~Z - zk), Ak - Pr(Z - zk), and Q- Pr(P -27
1) -~k xkPzk. I,et the zk be ordered in auch a way that p,~ G p,~~,. For any pair (zk, zi) we
can identify the average treatment effect as,,,~, defined in Result 4. If we have three pointa of
support zk, z~ and z,,, with p,~ G p„ G p.,~, the following rclation between the three average
treatment effects holds:
P:, - P:~ P:T - P.,
a:.~.r. - a~~.:. f a:.~.~~
P:m - P:. P~,~ - P..
For example suppose that p,~ - 0. Then Condition 3 is satisfied and the selected average
treatment effect is identified.~ The SATE is now related to the pairwise average treatment
effects in the following way:
K xkP:k K xk (Psk - P:, ) Ps,
(7) a - ~ a:..~o - ~ a,,,,,, f -a,~.~o
k-1 Q k-4 Q Q
where xk - Pr(7, - zk~Z ~ zo) and Q- Pr(P - 1~Z ~ zo). Equation (7) shows how close
we can get to identification of a if Condition 3 is not satisfied and we have no value za with
zero participation probability. The first term, ~kz~`1~La~~,,,, is identified without the
zero participation control group. From the second term p„a,,,~~Q, the factors p,, and Q are
identified and the ouly factor thaL is not identi(ic.d ia a,,,,~. I[ we can bouud this factor, thc
average treatment effect for the group who is already participating when Z- z~, we can get
a bound for a, using the approach to selection models advocated by Manski (1990a,1990b).
Eapecially ifp„ is small, i.e. if there is a control group with a amall participation probability,
this bound can be sharp.
7In this case the previously defined a„ ia equal to a,~,,a.28
5. CoNCLUS1oN. The SATE measures the average difference between the outcomes of
program participants and what participants' outcomes would have been had they not been
treated. When sotne individuals or groupa are ineligible to participate in a program, and
eligibility does not affect outcomes for other reasons, the SATE is identificd using a sim-
ple instrumental variables estimator. 1'hia estimator is ctlicicut - íL mak~ full use of thc
identifying information provided by program eligibility rules.
The possibility of identification through eligibility rules is established using the same
logic as recent arguments for identification based on the existence of a set of covariates for
which the probability of treatment approaches zero in the limit. The source of identifying
information is different, however, and likely to be more credible than identification through
latent index models of individual behavior. Program rules are a matter of public record,
and observed data can be used to verify enforcement of the rules. Identification through
eligibility rules may also provide a good forecast of future program effecta under the same
rules. Another attractive feature of this approach is that no eligible participant need be
denied treatment in experimental designs based on this principle.
Finally, we show that with mild additional assumptions abouL the participation decision,
we can identify a local average treatment effect even if there are no strictly ineligible groups
in the sample.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2: The selected average treatment effect a is equal to (F,[Y~A -29
1] - E[Y~A - 0])~(Pr(P - 1~A - 1). An efficient estimator can therefore be obtained by
substituting efficient estiinators for E[Y~A - 1], E[Y~A - 0] and Pr(P - 1~A - 1) in this
formula. We will sliow that
1) YA-, is an efficient estimator for E[Y~A - 1],
2) P~-, is an efficient estimator for Pr(P- 1~A - 1),
3) Y~-o is an efficient estimator for E[Y~A - 0] if the conditional variance of Yo given Z
does not depcnd on Z.
There are two steps. Firat we show that the model can be characterized by a finite number
of conditional moment restrictions. Second we ahow that given those moment restrictions
the three estirnators are efficient.
The model implies the following conditional moment reatrictiona: If A- 0 then
E[Y - B~Z] - 0 E[P~Z] - 0
If A - 1 then
E[P- h,(Z)~Z] - 0 E[Y - h2(Z)~Z] - 0
The model does not imply any other restrictiona. It is essential to show this before proving
efficiency using the Chamberlain bounds The argument goes as follows. Suppose we have a
datagenerating process for (Y, Z, P) with P binary, satisfying the moment conditions. Then
we can always construct a model that satiefies ( 1) and (2) as follows:
E[Yo~Z] - B30
Choose any non-constant function for E[Yo~Z, P - 0], let
E[Yo~Z, P- 1J -{B -(1 - h,(Z))E[YoIZ, P- Ol}~hr(Z)
and then we complete the model by choosing for all Z~ Zo
E[Yi~Z, P- 1] -{hz(Z) - B~ h,(Z) . E[Yo~Z, P- 1]}~h,(Z)
This constructed model satisfies E[Yo~Z] - 0 for all Z. For this construction it is essential
to have hr(Z) ~ 0 which is true when A- 1 by definition.
Given that the model is fully characterized by the conditional moments, it is straiglit-
forward to derive the bounds ïor the three quantities of interest: E[h,(Z)], F,[h~(Z)] and
B. The formulas in Chamberlain (1990, p 7) can be applied and simplified directly. First B.
Given a set of No observations with A - 0, the bound on the variance of ~o(B - B') is
~E`E[(Yo l B.)zIZ],~-i
This simplifies to E((Yo-B")2] if there is no heteroskedasticity. The variance of ~o(Ya-o-
B') is E[(Yo - B')~]. Therefore YA-o is efficient if there is no heteroskedasticity. In exactly
the same way we look at the variance bound for E[hr(Z)] and E[hz(Z)] given a set of N,
observations with A- 1. In both cases the variance is equal to the variance of the average.
In other words, YA-r and PA-, are efficient estimators.
QED.
Proof of Result 3: Suppose, without losing generality, p~, ~ p~. For all u such that




To prove 2~ 3 note that if Condition 2 holds, we have




whicó is non-negative because of Condition 2 and integrates out to one. To prove 3-~ 2
note that if f(u) in (1) is non-negative, it must he true that h(u, z~) ~ h(u, zo) which implies
condition 2 because we assumed ps, ~ p,,.
QED.
Proof of Result 4: First note that:
f(u) - f(ul ~- z) - P: . t(ul P- llz - Z) f(1 -P:) ' i(uIP - o, z- z)
We will use Y(u) as shorthand for E[Y~U - u]. Consider the conditional expectation of Y,
given P- 1 and Z- zl. It is equal to
f Yi(u) ' f(u~P - 1, Z- zl)du -
f Yi(u) '[P~ ' Í(u~P - 1, Z- zo) f
P:, - P~o f(u),du
P~, P.,
- P~E[Yi~P - 1, Z- zo] -f- P" - p~ ' f Yi(u)f(u)du
Pr~ P:,
We can cotnbine this with the conditional expectation of Yl given P- 1 and Z- zo to get:32
P~,pz~P~o lE[YiIP- 1,Z-zi] -p~E[YiIP- 1,Z-zo]~ - f Yi(u)I(u)du
Next, consider the conditional expectation of Yo given P- 1 and Z- zo. It equals
f Yo(u)f(u[P - 0, Z- zo)du - I Yo(u)~ I Í(u) - P~o f(uIP
- I, Z- zo)1du 1-p~ 1-p~
The third expectation of interest is that of Yo given P- 0 and Z- zl. It equals
f Yo(u)f(u~P - 0, Z- zi)du - f Yo(u)~ t f(u) - P~,
I(u[P - 1, Z- zi)~du
1 - P:, 1 - P~,
- I Yo(u)' ~ ~ f(u) -
P:o
f(u~P - ~, G- zo) -f P:, - PwÍ~u)1 du
~- P:, ~- P:, 1- P:,
The two conditional expectations of Yo combine to give
1- P:, ,(E[YoIP - I, Z- zi) - I- P~ E[YoIP- 1, Z- zo)~ - f Yo(u)f(u)du
Pr, - P~ l 1- P:,
Therefore we can identify the average treatment effect
1~Yi(t~) - Yo(u)~!(u)du
which is the average treatment effect for the group that changes its treatment status with
the change in the instrument.
Q~D.
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